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Reply to Bruggeman, Traag, and Uitermark
The Temporal Structure of Scientific Consen-
sus Formation (Shwed and Bearman 2010) 
developed a procedure—which did not 
require expert judgment—to evaluate the 
level of contestation in scientific literatures. 
Examining different cases of consensus and 
contestation, we showed that science may 
progress in a spiral pattern that quickly gener-
ates new questions in new domains from 
recent answers (e.g., climate change research), 
stagnate around old questions in a cyclical 
pattern (e.g., smoking research in the 1950s), 
or entrench in a flat pattern responding to 
irrelevant external critiques (e.g., research on 
autism and vaccines). Bruggeman, Traag, and 
Uitermark (hereafter BTU) argue that without 
distinguishing between positive and negative 
citations, our procedure is of little value. They 
arrive at this conclusion by misunderstanding 
the role of network communities in our proce-
dure. They then propose as an improvement a 
self-defeating solution that relies on distin-
guishing between postive and negative ties, 
requires expert evaluation, and destroys the 
possiblity of an unbiased evaluation. Avoid-
ing that trap was the point of our article.
While much of their comment considers 
instances of contestation in politics that have 
nothing to do with science, the relevant find-
ings they offer with respect to our analyses 
support our original findings. Given this, it is 
not surprising that BTU’s own calculations 
show that their concern with the valence of 
citations has no bearing on the evaluation of 
contestation levels. By accepting the com-
ment for publication, ASR’s editors prolong a 
period of flat argumentation in the sociology 
of science. In this reply we reiterate the origi-
nal article’s contribution and show how 
BTU’s findings strengthen ours. We conclude 
with remarks on the importance of symmetry, 
a guiding principle of our analysis that BTU 
completely abandoned.
If it seems that the original article, the 
comment, and the reply are talking past each 
other, it is because they are. In the original 
article we made arguments about scientific 
contestation, modularity as a global property 
of graphs, symmetry, comparability, and 
empirical results. In the comment, BTU dis-
cuss the allocation of nodes to communities, 
non-scientific discourse, and doing what the 
457 previous papers using modularity on top-
ics unrelated to ours did. Although of great 
interest to many people, these are different 
foci than those we considered.
Our article exploited the modularity com-
munity detection algorithm not for commu-
nity detection, but as a general property of 
networks. This enabled us to link black-boxing 
(an idea) with modularity (a measure) to pro-
vide a useful, symmetrical tool for sociolo-
gists of science to evaluate the state of 
contestation around politically laden issues. 
Specifically, we used maximal directed mod-
ularity as a way to quantitatively operational-
ize the imagery of black-boxing (Latour) or 
bottled ships (Collins). We showed that the 
measure fits the contestation and consensus 
trends in disparate science domains described 
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qualitatively (for validation) by field-specific 
experts. We developed our procedure by 
observing a simple homology between what 
Latour and Collins suggest changes in the 
process of consensus making, and what mod-
ularity quantifies—observed differences in 
the salience of internal parts. Validation of 
our procedure, however, is purely empirical: 
we did not claim or assume that modularity 
indexes contestation; we tested that idea and 
found that it did.
The main benefit of our measure is that it 
allows comparative research into science 
without field-specific expertise. A main 
requirement for a useful measure is what 
Latour defined as generalized symmetry—
rejection of any pre-categorization or pre-
demarcation of the field of inquiry. We 
achieved symmetry by offering a tool that 
requires no parameter specification or ana-
lyst’s judgment. To attain symmetry, the ana-
lyst must not impose interpretations on the 
data. Oddly, this is precisely what BTU criti-
cize us for. We have no interest in defending 
claims that we never made and are wrong. 
However, in the next section we focus on the 
analyses provided by the authors, and outline 
why their critique is irrelevant to the ideas in 
our article and actually strengthens our results.
Symmetry And negAtIve 
CItAtIonS
BTU’s main critique is that we ignore the 
content of ties and assume or interpret all ties 
as positive. BTU propose a modularity algo-
rithm for signed networks; that is, their algo-
rithm does not simply maximize modularity, 
it does so only on ties that are signed positive, 
while minimizing modularity on ties that are 
signed negative.
This could be a welcomed addition, for 
instances where the signing process itself may 
be taken for granted. Science, of course, is no 
such instance. This is why BTU fail to provide 
signed networks that are relevant for the discus-
sion of scientific consensus. In their own words, 
“To distinguish negative from positive refer-
ences, we would have to acquaint ourselves 
with the vernacular of cancer researchers and 
read thousands of articles, which is beyond our 
capabilities here” (Bruggeman, Traag, and Uit-
ermark 2012:1053). Had it been within BTU’s 
capabilities, all they would have provided us 
with is yet another expert-based, asymmetrical 
interpretation of the literature based on content 
analysis. The idea of our article is that one 
ought to refuse to do so—regardless of capa-
bilities—because doing so endangers the sym-
metry and objectivity that our analysis strives 
for.
But what are negative citations in science? 
Consider, for example, this exchange. Judging 
from BTU’s tone, their critique is clearly a 
negative citation of our article, focusing on 
what they see as flaws. And yet, they expose 
our analysis to more readers, prolong its ten-
ure in ASR’s pages, and broaden its linkage to 
the scientific communities interested in com-
munity detection algortithms, while substan-
tively strengthening our results. The border 
between negative and positive citations is 
fuzzy; negative citations imply recognition 
and contribute to the progress of science as 
much as positive citations (Cole and Cole 
1981:24–27). To argue that the symmetry con-
straint (which prohibits us from signing ties) is 
flawed, BTU need to demonstrate that when 
asking the same questions asymmetrically 
they reach significantly different conclusions 
regarding scientific consensus. This is not 
something their comment is oriented toward.
In the original article, we neither argued 
nor assumed that citations are positive. We 
noted that two different theories of citations 
(by Merton and Latour) imply that most—
although not all—citations are positive. From 
this we proposed that changes in contestation 
levels (which also likely mean changes in the 
ratio of negative to positive citations) are 
observable through scaled modularity. Our 
original article tested this and found it is the 
case. Scaled modularity distinguishes between 
periods of contestation and consensus in part 
because the ratio of negative citations to 
positive citations is different in such periods 
and the structural properties of negative cita-
tions are different from positive citations. 
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BTU’s own results demonstrate this. How-
ever, acknowledging the difference between 
positive and negative citations at the micro 
level of article construction does not mean the 
macro measures we employ must feed on 
such data. Signing citations and coding them 
as negative or positive requires domain spe-
cific expertise and human judgment—two 
issues we minimized in favor of a symmetri-




BTU charge us with assuming that negative 
citations have no implications for the com-
munities detected, and they provide an ele-
gant analysis to demonstrate that this 
assumption does not hold. We did not make 
this assumption. BTU are confused between 
the common use of community detection 
algorithms—for detecting communities—and 
our use of the same procedure for an evalua-
tion of a network macro property. That was 
one of the innovations of the original article.
BTU show that when they introduce even 
a small ratio of negative citations into the 
equation they get different results, which is 
reasonable. But this finding is not really rel-
evant for the argument we made. We made no 
claims about the actual community structure, 
which is the only thing they report. Huge dis-
similarities in the allocation of specific nodes 
to specific communities can yield similar 
(macro) moldularity scores. As a matter of 
fact, in many cases, they do (Good, Mont-
joye, and Clauset 2010). In addition, it is not 
surprising that arbitrarily signing some cita-
tions as positive and others as negative—
while taking that arbitrary value into the 
calculation—generates different results.
BTU show (in their Figure 1) that as more 
citations are arbitrarily defined as negative, dif-
ferent draws yield increasingly different com-
munity allocations. Our Figure 1 simply 
overlays theirs with the corresponding line 
representing the trend in scaled modularity for 
the cases and periods from our original article. 
BTU provide no explanations for the clear drop 
in the variance of different draws, apparent in 
1991 to 1992 in the smoking case and in 1994 
to 1995 in the skin cancer case. This trend cor-
responds closely to our findings;1 in 1992, the 
final EPA report on hazards of passive smoking 
terminated that debate, and in 1994 our analysis 
of the skin cancer case crosses the .1 value of 
scaled modularity, which we carefully sug-
gested as a possible threshold for consensus. 
Thus, it seems that (yes) arbitrarily defined 
negative citations generate different allocations 
of nodes to communities (which our procedure 
does not care about), but that when the litera-
ture is consensual, different draws are more 
coherent among themselves. In other words, 
when employing an algorithm that is sensitive 
to some random quality, consensual black-
boxed networks are more robust then networks 
with salient internal divisions.
Their Figure 1 thus replicates our findings. 
In fact, BTU (2012:1054) summarize their 
analysis saying: “During periods of epistemic 
rivalry, when the percentage of negative ties is 
higher, the difference will usually be larger. . . . 
the actual pattern of negative ties is unknown 
to us and remains an empirical question.” Our 
article answered this empirical question for 
seven cases and a century of research, and 
showed that periods of epistemic rivalry cor-
respond with scaled (unsigned) modularity.
SPeCIAlIzAtIon And 
the “SerIoUS FlAw” oF 
SCAlIng modUlArIty
BTU go to great length to argue that our scal-
ing of the modularity property is “a serious 
technical flaw” (BTU:1051). They call it 
renormalization rather than scaling. They 
argue it is wrong to scale modularity, which is 
“by definition normalized” (BTU:1052). 
Modularity (as part of the process of commu-
nity detection) is normalized for the number 
of ties (references); we scale it for the (logged) 
number of nodes (articles). Those are very 
different things. The normalization predefined 
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Figure 1. An Overlay of BTU’s Figure 1 with Modularity Trends from Shwed and Bearman 
(2010)
Note: The top panel refers to the literature about smoking hazards and the bottom panel to the 
carcinogenicity of solar radiation. In both cases, modularity trends suggested by Shwed and Bearman 
(2010) are indicative of a reduction in the variance of results from BTU’s procedure, following an 
independent random signing of parts of the original networks. This means that as a literature becomes 
consensual (indexed by the decreasing modularity trend line), even BTU’s random manipulation of 10 
percent of the network ceases to have an effect. Consensual literatures, black-boxed, are more robust.
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in the calculation of modularity pertains to 
connectivity, the number of ties in the net-
work, and not to network size. It is the 
required minimal normalization to allocate 
nodes into communities. At the risk of being 
didactic, this assignment process was not 
what our article was about.
We presented scaling to control for benign 
contestation—the natural process of scientific 
specialization, as well as the development of 
invisible colleges. These processes are a func-
tion of the literature’s size, regardless of its 
connectivity. BTU mention that out of 457 
expert papers cited by Fortunato (2010) none 
used our scaling. This is no coincidence, of 
course, but it is not condemning evidence 
either. It establishes that we were the first to 
focus on the modularity of a graph as a diag-
nostic concept (rather than on the communi-
ties it creates) in the specific context of 
citation networks where a big part of com-
munity creation is a product of size.
Thus we find BTU’s Figure 2 unremarkable: 
it demonstrates our point that much of what 
goes on in science is benign contestation. The 
figure also shows that without our scaling of 
modularity, it remains fairly constant through-
out the period. BTU (2012:1052) manage to 
support our substantive argument for scaling, 
while ignoring the scaling itself because we “did 
not infer renormalization within the theoretical 
framework on which modularity is built.” They 
show the growing specialization over size, they 
show that raw modularity remains stable over 
that time, and they ignore the empirical fact that 
throughout this period our scaling tracks impor-
tant processes such as the end of the dispute 
about safer cigarettes and the forming of con-
sensus around passive smoking.
SCIentIFIC ConSenSUS 
verSUS dUtCh PolItICS
BTU consider as a new case a public debate in 
Dutch newspapers. They bridge the immense 
gap between what they comment on—our dis-
cussion of scientific consensus formation—
and a political debate in the Dutch public 
sphere by arguing that their method is “very 
general” (BTU 2012:1051).2 They provide 
three colorful figures that reiterate the (undis-
puted) point that information on the nature of a 
tie may change community allocation in cross-
sectional networks. They show—with data far 
removed from the original context—that com-
munity allocation would have been different if 
tie valence were taken into account. The analy-
sis is not longitudinal and BTU do not report 
modularity—so we cannot tell whether this has 
any bearing on our approach—although the 
context is so different it is hard to determine 
what similar or different modularity trends 
would mean for our model of distinguishing 
benign contestation from epistemic rivalries in 
scientific literatures.
And yet, the Dutch newspaper analysis 
warrants the observation that BTU introduce 
a radically different context in order to show 
the utility of their extension of modularity, 
only to end up analyzing a subset of a subset 
of a subset of a subset of their original data.
Let us compare the data selection involved 
in our analysis with theirs. Both analyses 
define an issue with boolean search keywords. 
Our analysis selects on journals indexed by the 
Web of Science, they select on Lexis-Nexus. 
BTU add four more levels of data selection. 
First, they rely on only two newspapers, nei-
ther of which are among the top Dutch news-
papers with respect to circulation. Second, 
among all the articles they retrieved, BTU 
select only articles over 1,000 words. From 
these they manually generated a population of 
actors and references between them, labeling 
the references as positive, negative, or neutral. 
They then discarded the data labeled neutral 
(which actually means ambigous; BTU:1058). 
Finally, afer dispensing with an unreported 
ratio of the data twice, introducing coder bias 
and discarding more than half of the data, they 
restrict their analysis to only the largest con-
nected component—discarding an unreported 
proportion of whatever data they had left. That 
is not the symmetry we strived for.
ConClUdIng remArkS
BTU present three distinct analyses to chal-
lenge our methods and results. The first analy-
sis shows that community allocation changes 
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when tie type is taken into account. This has 
no relevance for our analysis, which makes no 
use of community allocation outcomes in the 
first place. In addition, community allocations 
may vary while modularity remains robust 
(Good et al. 2010). Their second analysis aptly 
demonstrates our idea (see Shwed and 
Bearman 2010:823–24) that a big part of sci-
entific contestation is what we label benign 
contestation—the normal process of special-
ization. BTU’s final analysis provides support 
for all of the claims we made with respect to 
what is wrong with expert judgment and why 
symmetry is a goal to strive for.
Our finding is that scaled modularity of cita-
tion networks indexes contestation. Scientific 
consensus sometimes increases and sometimes 
decreases, on specific issues in specific times. 
BTU (2012:1058) write that they “believe that 
[our] claims and findings do not stand up to 
scrutiny.” And yet, the trends we find in scaled 
modularity, without any data manipulation, fit 
broad expert reports on each of our seven 
cases—two of which (in the cases of autism 
and non-ionizing radiation) were made after 
our analysis. Nowhere in their comment do 
BTU supply any shred of relevant evidence that 
contradicts any of our findings, theories, or 
methods. That is the nature of belief.
BTU (2012:1052) also argue that our scal-
ing is not “within the theoretical framework 
on which modularity is built.” We plead 
guilty. We started with theoretical puzzles and 
insights from the sociology of science, found 
a tool (modularity) that seemed to relate to 
the theory, and went out to the field to test the 
utility of our tool. In the process, empirical 
reality (the fact that benign contestation is 
clearly size dependent) led us to modify our 
tool by scaling for size. We never attempted 
to be “within the theoretical framework” of 
our tool, because we use tools and theories to 
help us understand data. Theories and tools 
are something to work with, not something to 
be entraped within.
The main benefit of our method is that it 
enforces a robust symmetry. We leave no 
room for discretion, coder bias, or manipula-
tion of context and scope in data selection. 
This is why our method is useful for evaluat-
ing the state of contestation on scientific 
issues laden with political interests. The sym-
metry constraint actually makes it possible 
for us to say that we can identify when scien-
tists agree and disagree about important 
issues. We show that our approach works 
across such diverse cases as gravitational 
waves, anthropogenic climate change, and 
cancer and smoking. The method proposed in 
the comment is a technical expression of 
qualitative analyses that people have been 
doing for years. Our idea in the original arti-
cle was to show why that analysis strategy is 
not useful. That our commentators did that for 
us is very kind indeed.
notes
1. BTU report they replicated our data collection proce-
dures, but they start their analysis some 27 years later 
than ours in the smoking case.
2. It appears not general enough to be applied to the sub-
ject of our article, which is why BTU use arbitrary 
randomization instead of real data, and real data is 
used in a radically different context.
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